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Abstract. I offer a critical analysis of a view that has become a dominant aspect of recent thought on the
relationship between evolution and morality, and propose an alternative. An ingredient in Michael Ruse’s
‘error theory’ (Ruse 1995) is that belief in moral (prescriptive, universal, and nonsubjective) guidelines
arose in humans because such belief results in the performance of adaptive cooperative behaviors. This
statement relies on two particular connections: between ostensible and intentional types of altruism, and
between intentional altruism and morality. The latter connection is problematic because it makes morality
redundant, its role having already been fulfilled by the psychological dispositions that constitute
intentional altruism. Both behavioral ecology and moral psychology support this criticism, and neither
human behavioral flexibility nor the self-regard /other-regard distinction can provide a defense of the
error theory. I conclude that morality did not evolve to curb rampant selfishness; instead, the evolutionari-
ly recent ‘universal law’ aspect of morality may function to update behavioral strategies which were
adaptive in the paleolithic environment of our ancestors (to which our psychological dispositions are best
adapted), by means of norms more appropriate to our novel social environment.
‘‘We read the world wrong and say that it deceives us.’’Sir Rabindranath Tagore, Stray Birds, lxxv.
Introduction
Philosophers and scientists engaged in the application of evolutionary theory to
human morality are often said to be involved in ‘‘evolutionary ethics’’. Although
this discipline encompasses a broad range of philosophical viewpoints (reviewed in
Maienschein and Ruse (1999), Thompson (1999)), in recent years the label has
often come to be associated with a particular theory: the ‘‘error theory’’ or
‘‘sociobiological meta-ethics’’ propounded most notably by Michael Ruse (Ruse
1986a, 1986b, 1989, 1991, 1995, 1999). A body of critical discussion has developed
around this theory (e.g., Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990), Collier and Stingl
(1993), Campbell (1996), Joyce (2000)). This literature has been concerned in large
part with how an evolutionary view of morality sits with such concepts as truth and
falsity, objectivity, and justification. This paper contributes to a different strand of
the discussion by examining the adequacy of the proposed connection between
evolution and morality which forms the basis for Ruse’s ethical theory (e.g., Ayala
(1987), Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990), Sorell (1991), Rolston (1999)). I will
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argue that Ruse’s theory mischaracterizes this connection and the evolutionary
significance of morality in guiding human behavior, and I will propose a direction
for evolutionary ethics that overcomes these problems.
The evolutionary ethics ‘error theory’
An error theory asserts that we tend to believe in the truth of a statement S, despite
the fact that S is false. Specifically, the evolutionary ethics error theory holds that
attention to evolutionary theory and the apparent course of human evolution
provides an explanation of why we humans tend to believe what we do regarding
morality; but it also provides a basis for the assertion that these beliefs are false.
Ruse claims that this view literally turns moral philosophy into science (Ruse and
Wilson 1986), since the error theory is based squarely on empirical evidence
provided by evolutionary biology.
1The following is a summary of Ruse’s formulation of the error theory:
P1 – In many social animals, cooperative behavioral strategies have evolved
because of their adaptive value on the basis of natural selection among individuals.
P2 – Belief in moral (prescriptive, universal, and nonsubjective) guidelines has
arisen in humans because such belief results in the performance of adaptive
cooperative behaviors.
P3 – We have no reason to believe that moral guidelines are both adaptive and
true.
C – Moral guidelines are an (adaptive) illusion, our belief in them false.
P1 is the evolutionary account, the result of empirical studies and evolutionary
inference. P2 establishes a thesis as to the evolution of morality. P3 prepares the way
for the meta-ethical error theory made explicit in C, which has also been called
meta-ethical skepticism, nihilism, or subjectivism. The word ‘‘true’’ in P3 can be
reinterpreted as ‘‘having the foundation or status they purport to have in our
consciousness’’, and so is not meant to prejudge the matter of whether moral
judgments are primarily about truth and falsity. The conclusion from this line of
reasoning is that moral guidelines tend to appear, for good evolutionary reasons,
inescapable and categorically binding on us; but that in fact this appearance is a
sham, maintained by natural selection because it insures that individuals cooperate
with each other and therefore leave more offspring. If this thesis is true, the field of
meta-ethics is fundamentally misguided, since the history of our search for the
foundation of morality and the meanings of moral concepts is the history of people
investigating an illusion of their own (genetic and ontogenetic) creation. Ruse’s
expositions of this error theory, especially (1995), may be consulted for further
clarification of the position and the concepts involved.
This paper will focus on an analysis of P2 of the above reasoning, where the
nature of the connection between evolution and morality is postulated. Two logical
1 Prof. Ruse has endorsed the following outline and my further descriptions as an accurate representa-
tion of his view (1997, personal communication).
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steps are implicit there in the link between ‘human cooperative behaviors’ and
‘moral guidelines’, the first of which will be dealt with in the next section, and the
second in the following section.
From ostensible altruism to intentional altruism
To illustrate the first logical step implicit in P2, one may distinguish between two
senses of the term ‘altruism’. The first refers to social behaviors that prima facie
incur a fitness cost to the performer and provide a benefit to another individual. This
sense may be designated as ostensible altruism, which is roughly what Voorzanger
calls ‘bioaltruism’ (1984). It is the sense of ‘altruism’ that is used by observers of
social interactions who are ignorant of intentions and of effects on reproductive
success. The altruism being ‘ostensible’ and the cost ‘prima facie’ mean that the
behavior appears (to some observer) to incur a net cost to the performer, which is
the only reason it is called ‘altruism’. In reality the prima facie cost may persist after
scientific investigation, or it may not; appearance may or may not be actuality. If a
cooperative behavior appears to an observer to incur a net cost to the performer, that
behavior can be labeled ostensible altruism. This sense of ‘altruism’ is often used,
but it is only useful as a heuristic or a stimulus to research, rather than as a biological
category, because it focuses on appearances rather than reality and therefore
obscures the difference between adaptive and maladaptive behaviors. Saying that a
behavior is ostensibly altruistic implies that we are ignorant about whether it incurs
a fitness cost to the performer. This does not render the term useless, however, for
many terms in science imply ignorance but are valuable for their heuristic or
research-stimulating qualities (‘paradox’ being another in behavioral ecology).
To date, the evidence of behavioral ecology suggests that all typical instances of
ostensible altruism in nature are adaptive relative to available alternatives. In each
case either the perceived cost is outweighed by inclusive fitness benefits (Hamilton
1964; Grafen 1982; Voorzanger 1994), or else the performer is being manipulated or
is constrained by a tradeoff, and has no recourse to more adaptive alternatives
(Stearns 1992; Kempenaers and Sheldon 1996; Payne 1998). (Evolutionary ethicists
have generally not considered the latter class as providing examples of altruism,
however.) In accordance with evolutionary theory and evidence from behavioral
ecology, then, ostensible altruism will be assumed for now to be adaptive behavior,
although this is an empirical matter and subject to further research. At least one
caveat is important here: because of evolutionary lag, the current behavior of an
organism might not be adaptive relative to alternatives. In terms of the error theory
outlined above, ostensible altruism refers to the ‘cooperative behaviors’ described in
P1.
Ostensible altruism is the result of behavioral observation, and leaves open the
question of what kind of intentions or motivations are involved. As such it is distinct
from what can be called intentional altruism, a phenomenological term dealing with
the intentions of agents, which are not directly dealt with in behavioral studies. A
conventional dictionary definition of ‘altruism’, such as ‘‘regard for others as a
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principle of action’’ (OED), approximates this intentional sense of the term.
Intentional altruism has to do with feelings of devotion and attitudes of concern for
others’ welfare. An act is altruistic in this sense if and only if the actor’s intent was
generous or other-regarding. It has nothing to do with whether a behavior incurs a
fitness cost to the performer, or even whether it appears to do so. Just as the
intentions of agents are not directly relevant to ostensible altruism, the outward
manifestations of behavior are the wrong place to focus when discussing intentional
altruism per se. Ostensible altruism and intentional altruism, though often occurring
together, are logically independent. If a behavior that benefits another individual
seems to bear a cost to the performer, it may be called ostensible altruism. If a
behavior is performed out of a motivation to care for others, it is intentional
altruism. Intentional altruism is perhaps best applied to humans, where we are most
aware of the nature of intentionality. Whether intentional altruism in humans is
associated with a net fitness cost to the ‘altruist’ has not been established empirical-
ly.
The first step undertaken by P2 is that intentional altruism arose in humans as a
mechanism for ostensible altruism. Certain cooperative behaviors constitute adap-
tive traits; in order for humans to exhibit these traits, psychological dispositions of
concern for the welfare of others evolved. Emotions like sympathy and affection are
therefore natural to humans. They have been maintained by natural selection
because they result in behaviors that are adaptive.
This link between ostensible altruism and intentional altruism is actually better
supported than one would gather from reading much evolutionary ethics literature,
which generally mentions only nepotism and dyadic ‘‘you scratch my back and I’ll
scratch yours’’ reciprocity before moving away from mechanisms to the more
philosophical aspects of the evolution-morality relationship. Many typical human
altruistic impulses are not explained by those two mechanisms. The last thirty years
have, however, seen considerable development in the explanation of typical human
emotional responses and cooperative tendencies. Indirect reciprocity, where fitness
benefits or costs return to an individual, e.g. via reputation in one’s community, has
broad implications for human cooperation, and provides an evolutionary explana-
tion of the human tendency to perform cooperative acts that involve neither close
relatives nor one-to-one reciprocity (Alexander 1979, 1987, 1992). Other mecha-
nisms for the generation of cooperative behaviors have been proposed in studies of
reliable communication (Zahavi 1995), by-product mutualism (Brown 1987), and
manipulation (Dawkins 1982). Group or multi-level selection theory may provide
another way of viewing these same mechanisms (Goodnight and Stevens 1997).
Such mechanisms and theoretical developments provide testable predictions regard-
ing the behavioral tendencies of humans in particular circumstances. A unified
evolutionary theory of human cooperative strategies could be tested by comparing it
to the typical observed structure of human cooperation (including its variability).
The proposed link between ostensible and intentional altruism would be supported
insofar as actual human altruistic tendencies are found to be measured, directed, and
even witheld in accordance with the theory of human cooperative strategies.
Here, in lieu of such a theory, this link between ostensible and intentional altruism
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will be assumed. Darwin’s suggestion will be granted that ‘‘the social instincts both
of man and the lower animals have no doubt been developed by the same steps’’
(Darwin (1871): 98). An implication of this statement is that human emotional
tendencies towards concern for others’ welfare evolved to coordinate our behavior
with individual reproductive success. As hunger leads us to eat, and sex drives (at
least used to) lead us to procreate, it is plausible that sympathetic emotions lead us to
cooperate. To guide our performance of actions that are adaptive but ostensibly
altruistic, we have developed altruistic intentional states.
From intentional altruism to morality?
To this point evolution has been used to explain the source of our typical psycholog-
ical dispositions and behavioral tendencies, and has linked emotion and behavior in
a standard way for evolutionary studies of animal behavior (Alcock 1993). Inten-
tional altruism is the psychological facilitator of ostensibly altruistic behavior.
However, the evolutionary ethical theorist realizes that intentional altruism and
morality are not the same thing. The former constitutes mere sentiments or desires,
whereas the latter has more of the nature of a code of laws that are universal,
prescriptive, and non-subjective (sensu Ruse). Even the emotivist about morality
recognizes the need to distinguish moral sentiments from other kinds of sentiments.
Part of what we mean by ‘moral’ is precisely that these sentiments purport to have
some priority over others.We don’t just feel like doing altruistic behavior x; we feel,
or think, that we ought to do x, and that others in present circumstances should do it
too, and that we have no choice about this obligation, and so on. So far in the logic
of the evolutionary ethics error theory, no explanation has been provided for this
moral significance or distinction we tend to associate with certain dispositions and
behaviors. No explanation has been provided for why tend to think some options are
right and others wrong. Right and wrong and a sense of binding obligation are part
(but not all– see, e.g., Foot (1978)) of the subject matter of ethics, so a connection
between our altruistic motivating sentiments and the institution or experience of
right and wrong is a crucial step in the production of an evolutionary ethical theory.
The second step inherent in P2 intends to provide this connection. In the discussion
that follows, ‘morality’ will refer to this institution or experience of right and wrong
(a moral law), in order to be consistent with Ruse’s use of the term.
The evolutionary ethics error theory holds that morality, with its peculiar
attributes such as prescriptivity, universality, and non-subjectivity (sensu Ruse),
evolved solely to maintain the edifice of adaptive cooperation. In the words of Ruse,
‘‘Unless we think morality is objectively true– a function of something outside of
and higher than ourselves– it would not work.’’ (Ruse (1989): 268). Morality, on
this view, functions as a motivation for ostensible altruism.
One way to assess this premise is to attempt to match the requirements of morality
with some level of understanding of human cooperative strategies, and see if they
align well (e.g., Trigg (1982), Rottschaefer and Martinsen (1990)). A major problem
with the error theorist’s hypothesis, however, is evident before any such analysis is
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performed: the hypothesis simply makes morality redundant. The evolutionary
ethics error theorist enlists the moral law to take up a post that is already occupied.
The caring sentiments natural to our species (intentional altruism) can be felt and
discussed without reference to apparently objective moral guidelines. The very
function of those sentiments, it has been granted, is to achieve adaptive behaviors
that are ostensibly altruistic. Therefore we might expect neuroscientists to discover
the proximate neural mechanisms for biases in our minds that predispose us to be
social beings, having certain altruistic tendencies and performing certain coopera-
tive behaviors. We are motivated to be cooperative by social desires. ‘‘No man is an
Island’’, not because we all obey universal prescriptions to this effect; in fact, such
prescriptions need not enter into it. Rather, no man is an island because ‘‘every man
is a piece of the Continent’’, because our emotional dispositions reflect our evolved
nature as social and cooperative beings. Given the role of intentional altruism,
humans would be cooperative regardless of whether we recognized an apparently
objective moral law demanding it of us. The evolutionary ethics error theory
therefore fails to explain morality.
For evidence of the redundancy of morality in the evolutionary ethics error
theory, one can look first to the ostensible altruism in nature outside of our species.
Cooperative behaviors are widespread in nature at all levels of the hierarchy of
psychological complexity (Alcock 1993). The forms of this ostensible altruism
include the nepotism and reciprocity that evolutionary ethicists use to ground human
morality (de Waal 1996). Nonhuman animals still care for their young and other
relatives, show restraint in fighting, give warning calls, protect each other, share
food, and contribute other valuable services to others. Why humans should have to
possess a radically different mechanism from these other animals in order to achieve
results of the same general type, requires some explanation. The evolutionary
ethicist who postulates an illusion of objective moral guidelines as a vehicle for
adaptive behavior is proposing a biologically unprecedented mechanism for a
purpose which is achieved regularly in nature by much more straightforward means.
Further evidence can be provided from the human species by the moral psycho-
logist. A direct implication of supposing that the performance of ostensible altruism
requires morality, is that cooperative actions are always prompted by adherence to
the moral law. This is of course not the case. Few would claim that such attitudes as
sympathy, esprit de corps, or family devotion are always, or even often, adopted
because we believe that a transcendent imperative exists for us to do so. These
attitudes nevertheless facilitate behaviors that would be characterized as ostensible
altruism. People do many things not for moral reasons, which produce ostensibly
altruistic, adaptive, cooperative behavior. Recent work in social psychology has
supported this contention by experimentally separating adherence to moral guide-
lines from empathetic feelings as motivations for altruism (Batson et al. 1995;
Batson and Moran 1999). Moreover, two recent analyses of motivations for
charitable giving have found that although an adherence to moral duty sometimes
plays a role, it often does not, and other significant motivations are unrelated to a
recognition of moral norms (Ray 1998; Ribar and Wilhelm 2002).
Ostensible altruism places no unique requirements on our biological constitution.
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It does not require a radically different solution to what is in fact a very common
type of problem in nature, in humans as well as in other organisms: the problem that
an organism must exhibit certain behaviors in certain circumstances, and alter or
restrain those behaviors as circumstances change. We can be moved to exhibit
ostensible altruism in the same sense as we are moved to seek a mate, to eat, to
assert our position in relevant hierarchies, to defend ourselves, and to do many other
things– without the intrusion of a putative universal law.
What about human behavioral flexibility?
Two reasons have been proposed as to why we need the force of morality in order to
behave in an adaptive manner. The first is our behavioral flexibility. Humans are
unprecedented in our cognitive complexity and the breadth of the field of possible
courses of action. However, this does not explain why imagined objective guidelines
are therefore necessary to the achievement of cooperative behaviors. Humans, with
all our complexity and flexibility, can be hungry, tired, angry, in love, jealous,
impatient, afraid, hurting, or otherwise desirous or faced with situations character-
ized by the necessity to make a decision and exhibit some type of behavior. We
perform appropriately without the aid of any grandiose illusions with regard to these
things. This is not to say that we do not moralize about them; rather, we do not
require, and so we do not construct, psychological illusions of transcendent
requirements specifically to fulfill those needs. Feeding is obviously adaptive, and
mechanisms (e.g., hunger, set eating times) are in place to assure such behavior in
humans, although this behavior can be and often is overridden by individuals in
various circumstances. Mechanisms are in place for many other adaptive human
behaviors as well, such as mating, for which we have sex drives, notions of
attractiveness, and courtship rituals. For no other behavior that humans exhibit,
regardless of how complex and flexible it requires us to be, have philosophers or
biologists suggested that we need the manufacture and elaboration of a set of beliefs
of the sort that some claim to have evolved for the sake of achieving ostensible
altruism.
What about the other-regarding nature of altruism?
The second way in which evolutionary ethicists may attempt to explain why
cooperation alone, of all our adaptive behaviors, must be achieved through the
construction of a false belief system, relies on a distinction between a ‘self-regard’
that comes most easily to us because of our evolutionary heritage, versus an
‘other-regard’ that is required by morality. On this view, our ancestors were so used
to being selfish that they needed moral guidelines to counteract that natural
tendency.
This reasoning makes a category mistake, however. The ‘self-regard’ and the
‘other-regard’ in this argument operate on two different levels that are logically
independent of each other. Like all successful organisms, we humans tend to be
‘self-regarding’ in our behavior in a sense related to fitness, but to say this conflicts
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with other-regarding intentions is to confuse behavioral effects with psychological
states. Adaptive behavior, whether we find it useful to call it ‘altruism’ or not, is by
definition not other-regarding in an evolutionarily relevant sense. The fact that such
behavior may be accompanied by or motivated by attitudes of concern for others
neither changes this fact nor conflicts with it.
Conflating evolutionary and psychological levels of self- or other-regard possibly
stems from our tendency to overintellectualize our experience. Our beliefs about our
situation, such as opinions that our behaviors are other-regarding or self-regarding,
do not matter to our evolved desires. We do not get hungry, for an analogous
example, because we think that food is good for us. We may or may not have beliefs
as to what food does for us. Regardless, the ultimate (evolutionary) reason why we
want to eat is simply because food is good for us, whether we know it or not, and so
our adapted constitution produces the appropriate desires in us. Evolutionary theory
applied to human psychology predicts that our sentimental and behavioral tenden-
cies will track our biological interests. Such theory provides no basis for dis-
tinguishing between ‘self-regarding’ and ‘other-regarding’ types of adaptive be-
havior; we must seek elsewhere for such a basis. All adaptive behavior is self-
regarding in the only sense that is relevant to evolutionary analysis, which is of
course the level at which the behavior is being explained here. In accordance with
evolutionary theory, our constitution provides us with emotions and other incentives
for performing certain actions that are (or were) adaptive, regardless of whether we
happen to consider them ‘self-regarding’ or ‘other-regarding’. In fact, we are likely
to have performed those actions in an adequate fashion long before we could reflect
with such philosophical subtlety on their nature. This contrasts sharply with the
view of the error theory, that our reflections on the nature of our actions pose a
problem for achieving adaptive behaviors, a problem that can only be solved by the
evolution of radically new psychological mechanisms.
Our tendencies towards certain attitudes and actions, far from depending on our
opinions or intentions as to who is to benefit from them, generally operate regardless
of whether we think anyone will benefit, including ourselves. Often the existence of
an emotional incentive easily overrides notions we might have of benefit. We can
wish to do something solely for the emotional payback, regardless of any known
benefits. Why do we like candy? We may not even know about sugar. We may not
know that ice cream, chocolate bars, and soft drinks are exploiting an old emotional
incentive for gaining adequate nutrition. We like such things for the incentive our
adapted constitution has produced in us (sweet taste), regardless of the benefit. And,
of course, we can like them even if sugar in these modern forms is not really a
benefit. The same argument can be made regarding sexual activity. These cases
demonstrate that we can even be disposed to do things which we know could
actually jeopardize our personal welfare more than aid it. Another example of this is
some instances of violence, such as small-scale fights over trivial matters. Our
evolved constitution might predispose us to aggression, and we may never stop to
think that appeasing our (or someone else’s) angry desires in a particular instance
may not be in anyone’s best interest. The point here is not that behavior in these
cases is maladaptive, for we can use adaptive examples too (caring for my young
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may not be in my best interest as an individual, but I do it anyway, even realizing
that fact). Rather, the point is that our knowledge of which actions will benefit
ourselves is not at the helm when we feel moved to exhibit these behaviors.
Likewise, we can easily be predisposed to attitudes and actions on behalf of others,
when these return fitness benefits to us. Evolutionary ethicists in favor of the error
theory must misuse the self-other distinction, and underestimate the persuasive
powers of our nervous and endocrine systems, in order to provide a case that
morality’s ultimate function is to curb our selfishness and ensure that we cooperate.
Morality’s efficacy as a vehicle for ostensible altruism
If the relationship between morality and adaptive cooperation were as simple as the
error theory proposes, much of human moral experience would be left unexplained.
For instance, morality is characterized by a great deal of reflection and deliberation
which accompanies the making of moral decisions. As Hare (1981) notes, morality
has an intuitive level but also a critical level. On the basis of evolutionary theory,
one would expect the critical level to consist of exploration of the facts of the matter
(e.g., who is involved, who will find out, what is the situation). The resulting
decision should be based on a cost-benefit analysis; and, when pressed, our
intuitions would provide a rough and ready approximation to this. Throughout
recorded history, however, the deliberation that has accompanied moral decision has
often been much more abstract and not restricted to the facts of the matter (e.g.,
contemplation of the foundations of morality). The more such thought is necessary
to the practice of morality, the less efficient and therefore the less adaptive the
mechanism is. It is therefore understandable why Ruse says that ‘‘too heavy an
emphasis on thought in morality worries me’’ (Ruse (1995): 266). A simpler, more
straightforward desire to perform certain altruistic behaviors, together with the
capacity to perform a (perhaps nonconscious (Alexander 1992)) cost-benefit analy-
sis on the basis of the facts of the situation, is a more parsimonious and more
adaptive, as well as biologically well precedented mechanism, than the time-
consuming, often confusing and sometimes agonizing deliberative capacity that we
call morality. If morality, as distinct from our psychological tendencies to be
altruistic in certain circumstances, arose simply as a motivator of ostensible
altruism, its efficiency is dubious when one looks at the history of moral philosophy,
which is characterized by millennia of the moral capacity challenging and often
bewildering humans. Similar obstacles to efficient and consistent action do not seem
to plague other behavioral traits, traits which do not seem to be different from
ostensible altruism in terms of the psychological mechanisms that would be required
to carry them out.
Incidentally, the existence of cooperating members of society who are no longer,
or never were, under the influence of an illusion of objective, prescriptive, nonsub-
jective moral guidelines, is in itself evidence against the necessity of such an illusion
for cooperation. That a realization of this has not sent proponents of the error theory
back to the drawing board is curious, for the history of moral philosophy, and even
society at large, is replete with such examples. Subjectivists, relativists, and skeptics
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may be a minority, but is there any evidence that they are sociopaths, or people who
either refuse or are unable to cooperate in the sense of performing adaptive social
behaviors? If ostensible altruism can be achieved just as easily when ‘the cat is out
of the bag’, i.e. when we no longer believe that a transcendent law obtains, then the
main thesis that ‘‘human beings function better if they are deceived by their
genes . . . ’’ (Ruse and Wilson (1986): 425) is undermined. On the other hand, if we
do function better to any extent when deceived, this is an empirical statement, and
evidence to this effect must be adduced. The evolutionary ethicist must show that
relativists, skeptics, subjectivists, including all who believe in the error theory, are
less generous members of society. In fact no one has yet produced evidence to this
effect. This is to be expected, because if we jettison moral objectivity we are still left
with that ubiquitous mechanism for achieving adaptive behaviors, desire.
Towards an investigation of the ultimate function of the moral law
The thesis that morality did not evolve to curb the selfish course of human behavior
is perhaps counterintuitive. Moral guidelines create internal conflict when they
compete with the gratification of contrary desires. Because of this, we slide easily
from a belief that morality does often contradict selfish desires, to the belief that
without moral guidelines we would be creatures of unrestrained immediate self-
gratification, incapable of cooperative or sympathetic activity. This mistake opens
the door for the evolutionary ethics error theory, but both behavioral ecology and
human moral psychology attest that this slide is in fact a mistake. The premise that
we humans are constantly going against our self-interest in order to adhere to moral
laws that contradict all of our other motivations is perhaps attractive because it is
self-serving (it makes all of us out to be moral heroes); but upon closer scrutiny this
premise fails. In fact, other species, our own ancestors, and many people today,
cooperate in ways that are adaptive because of the intentional altruism that is part of
their evolved nature, and yet do not recognize an objective or universal moral law
which demands such behavior. Even those people who do recognize such a moral
law are motivated to cooperate and care in other ways than just a sense of obligation
to follow that law.
Does morality have an adaptive function, then, and if so what is it? Some would
argue that it does not have one. However, the significant areas of concordance in
moral intuitions across cultures, and the persistence of certain intuitions across
gradients of time, socioeconomic condition, and educational level, justifies the
search for a functional explanation, which is likely to be evolutionary (Alexander
1971; O’Neill and Petrinovich 1998). Although I will postpone detailed considera-
tion, here I will sketch a direction in which evolutionary ethics might profitably
proceed. In approaching this matter, a theorist must of course address the fact that
morality does indeed guide human behavior– none of what has been said here
disputes this fact. However, the foregoing argument suggests that morality must
guide action in a more complex way than has been suggested by the error theory.
A greater degree of understanding of the origin, and thus any biological function,
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of morality may be gained from paying closer attention to the fact that moral
experience in a broader sense did not spring forth at once in all of its current
complexity, but rather developed over time from an ancestral state, as did all of our
other cognitive and cultural attributes (Alexander 1987; Tomasello 1999). A broad
consideration of morality would include a range of aspects, some ancient and some
of more recent origin. Nepotism, for instance, is one of the most ancient aspects of
social behavior, one which we share not only with chimpanzees but also with ants
(Hamilton 1964). Thus the moral requirement to care for one’s family must be
understood in the broader context of nepotism among all animals that associate
preferentially with kin (Alexander 1974). On the other hand, the consideration of all
humans as morally equivalent, such that ethical theories can identify an individual
with a letter A or x, has achieved the high level of importance it plays in our moral
codes much more recently. The early human situation depended much less on such a
notion, since almost all of our daily interaction would have been with members of
our own kin group. Today both nepotism and moral egalitarianism operate in the
moral experience of many people, although they do not have the same origin.
If many of our psychological tendencies were shaped in a past situation that was
different from that of today in some relevant ways, as the evidence suggests is the
case (Barkow et al. 1992), this raises the possibility that the internal conflict that
accompanies the making of some of our moral decisions may result from a
discordance between modern moral codes and the set of behavioral strategies that
would have been adaptive during most of our evolutionary history. If this is true, one
would predict a correlation between the degree of internal conflict we experience
with regard to a particular moral guideline, and its variance from the adaptive
strategies of hunter-gatherers living in small kin groups. Moreover, the moral law, in
Ruse’s sense of a set of universal, prescriptive, and nonsubjective guidelines, is
likely a recent phenomenon, postdating the hunter-gatherer period. This concept of a
moral law may function to update our behavior to the present social environment
from that of our paleolithic ancestors. A much older predisposition to obey parents
and other leaders real and imagined may have been co-opted, with existing sources
of moral authority being replaced by a universal God or a value-laden universe. A
prediction from this hypothesis of the moral law as an updating mechanism, is that
moral guidelines should play a larger role in motivating a behavior the more
different that behavior is from what would have been adaptive in the ancestral
environment. For example, Jesus did not need to give, and so did not give, an
exhortation to care for members of one’s own social group. Rather, one of his most
cited commands (in the Good Samaritan parable, Luke 10:30–37) was to care for
strangers, even those with varying religious beliefs or ethnicity. This command is at
variance with evolved predispositions, and was required to steer behavior in a
manner more appropriate in the modern situation.
Whether this hypothesis is generally true of morality depends on, among other
things, a demonstration that modern moral norms suspected to be at variance with
older predispositions, are actually adaptive in a post-agricultural, sedentary social
environment. For if they are not adaptive, the alternative hypothesis would be
favored that this prescriptive aspect of morality has no adaptive function, and is
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instead the product of a cultural evolution that has become disconnected from
individual reproductive success (Dawkins 1976). A place to begin such a test is an
analysis of how an adherence to these moral norms feeds fitness benefits back to the
performer through reputation and social status (Alexander 1987).
On this view, if our genes have constructed anything to ensure cooperation, it is
the set of emotional predispositions that were labeled ‘‘intentional altruism’’ earlier
in this paper. These developed over hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions of
years. Prescriptive, universal, and nonsubjective moral guidelines, on the other
hand, are not a genetically induced illusion. Rather, they are hypothesized to be the
product of the period since the agricultural revolution, when our culture began to
change too quickly to be effectively tracked by organic evolution. Although there
may have been some genetic change in adaptation to the new social situation,
modern aspects of morality may largely function as a cultural surrogate for genetic
adaptation, analogous to parental instructions that children not eat too much candy.
Much of what is distinctive about the morality of modern humans may enhance
individual fitness by modifying behavior appropriately for the novel social environ-
ments we have created for ourselves.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the following people for reading and commenting on previous
versions of this manusript: R.D. Alexander, R.J. Berry, E. David Cook, April Lahti,
Alec Lindsay, Simon Northcott, Kate Rawles, Andrew Richards, Holmes Rolston
III, Michael Ruse, Kim Sterelny, Roger Trigg, Bret Weinstein, and an anonymous
reviewer.
References
Alcock J. 1993. Animal Behavior: An Evolutionary Approach. Sinauer Associates, Sunderland, MA.
Alexander R.D. 1971. ‘The search for an evolutionary philosophy of man’ Proceedings of the Royal
Society. 84:, pp. 99–120.
Alexander R.D. 1974. ‘The evolution of social behavior’. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 5:
325–383.
Alexander R.D. 1979. Darwinism and Human Affairs. University of Washington Press, Seattle.
Alexander R.D. 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems. Aldine de Gruyter, Hawthorne, NY.
Alexander R.D. 1992. ‘Biological considerations in the analysis of morality’. In: Nitecki M.H. and
Nitecki D.V. (eds), Evolutionary Ethics. SUNY Press, Albany, NY, pp. 163–196.
Ayala F.J. 1987. ‘The biological roots of morality’. In: Thompson P. (ed.), Issues in Evolutionary Ethics.
SUNY Press, Albany, NY, pp. 293–316.
Barkow J.H., Cosmides L. and Tooby J. (eds) 1992. The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the
Generation of Culture. Oxford University Press, New York.
Batson C.D., Klein T.R., Highberger L. and Shaw L.L. 1995. ‘Immorality from empathy-induced
altruism: when compassion and justice conflict’. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68:
1042–1054.
Batson C.D. and Moran T. 1999. ‘Empathy-induced altruism in a prisoner’s dilemma’. European Journal
of Social Psychology 29: 909–924.
Brown J.L. 1987. Helping and Communal Breeding in Birds. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
650
Campbell R. 1996. ‘Can Biology Make Ethics Objective?’. Biology and Philosophy 11: 21–31.
Collier J. and Stingl M. 1993. ‘Evolutionary naturalism and the objectivity of morality’. Biology and
Philosophy 8: 47–60.
Darwin C. 1871. The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Race. 1874th edn. John Murray,
London.
Dawkins R. 1976. The Selfish Gene. 1989th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Dawkins R. 1982. The Extended Phenotype. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
de Waal F. 1996. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Foot P. 1978. Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. University of California Press,
Berkeley, CA.
Goodnight C.J. and Stevens L. 1997. ‘Experimental studies of group selection: what do they tell us about
group selection in nature?’. American Naturalist 150: S59–S79.
Grafen A. 1982. ‘How not to measure inclusive fitness’. Nature 298: 425–426.
Hamilton W.D. 1964. ‘The genetical evolution of social behavior, I and II’. Journal of Theoretical
Biology 7: 1–52.
Hare R.M. 1981. Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Joyce R. 2000. ‘Darwinian ethics and error’. Biology & Philosophy 15: 713–732.
Kempenaers B. and Sheldon B.C. 1996. ‘Why do male birds not discriminate between their own and
extra-pair offspring?’. Animal Behaviour 51: 1165–1173.
Maienschein J. and Ruse M. (eds) 1999. Biology and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge University
Press, New York.
O’Neill P. and Petrinovich L. 1998. ‘A preliminary cross-cultural study of moral intuitions’. Evolution
and Human Behavior 19: 349–367.
Payne R.B. 1998. ‘Brood parasitism in birds: Strangers in the nest’. Bioscience 48: 377–386.
Ray L. 1998. ‘Why we give: Testing economic and social psychological accounts of altruism’. Polity 30:
383–415.
Ribar D.C. and Wilhelm M.O. 2002. ‘Altruistic and joy-of-giving motivations in charitable behavior’.
Journal of Political Economy 110: 425–457.
Rolston H. III 1999. Genes, Genesis, and God. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Rottschaefer W.A. and Martinsen D. 1990. ‘Really taking Darwin seriously: An alternative to Michael
Ruse’s Darwinian metaethics‘. In: Thompson P. (ed.), Issues in Evolutionary Ethics. SUNY Press,
Albany, NY, pp. 375–408.
Ruse M. 1986a. ‘Evolutionary ethics: A phoenix arisen’. In: Thompson P. (ed.), Issues in Evolutionary
Ethics. SUNY Press, Albany, NY, pp. 225–247.
Ruse M. 1986b. Taking Darwin Seriously: A Naturalistic Approach to Philosophy. Blackwell, Oxford.
Ruse M. 1989. The Darwinian Paradigm: Essays on Its History, Philosophy and Religious Implications.
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
Ruse M. 1991. ‘The significance of evolution’. In: Singer P. (ed.), A Companion to Ethics. Blackwell,
Oxford, pp. 500–510.
Ruse M. 1995. Evolutionary Naturalism: Selected Essays. Routledge, London.
Ruse M. 1999. ‘Evolutionary ethics: what can we learn from the past?’. Zygon 34: 435–451.
Ruse M. and Wilson E.O. 1986. ‘Moral philosophy as applied science’. In: Sober E. (ed.), Conceptual
Issues in Evolutionary Biology. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 421–438.
Sorell T. 1991. Scientism: Philosophy and the Infatuation with Science. Routledge, London.
Stearns S.C. 1992. The Evolution of Life Histories. Oxford University Press, New York.
Thompson P. 1999. ‘Evolutionary ethics: its origins and contemporary face’. Zygon 34: 473–484.
Tomasello M. 1999. ‘The human adaptation for culture’. Annual Review of Anthropology 28: 509–529.
Trigg R. 1982. The Shaping of Man: Philosophical Aspects of Sociobiology. Blackwell, Oxford.
Voorzanger B. 1984. ‘Altruism in sociobiology: a conceptual analysis’. Journal of Human Evolution 13:
33–39.
Voorzanger B. 1994. ‘Bioaltruism reconsidered’. Biology and Philosophy 9: 75–84.
Zahavi A. 1995. ‘Altruism as a handicap– the limitations of kin selection and reciprocity’. Journal of
Avian Biology 26: 1–3.
651
